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Abstract
We consider a sequential decision model over multi-tier supply chain networks and
show that in particular, for series parallel networks, there is a unique equilibrium. We
provide a linear time algorithm to compute the equilibrium and study the impact and
invariant of the network structure to the total trade flow and social welfare.
1 Introduction
Supply chain networks in practice are multi-tier and heterogeneous. A firm’s decision in-
fluences not only other firms within the same tier but also across. The literature on game
theoretical models of supply chain networks, however, has largely focused on two extreme
cases: heterogeneous 2-tier networks (bipartite graph) Kranton and Minehart [2001] and
Bimpikis et al. [2014] and a linear chain of n-tier firms Wright and Wong [2014] and Nguyen
[2017]. One main reason for this is that most models of sequential decision making in multi-
tier supply chain networks are intractable. Sequential decision making is a well-observed
phenomenon in supply chains because firms at the top tier typically need to make decisions
on the quantity and the price to sell to firms in the next tier and the buying firms then decide
how much to buy from which suppliers, and continue to pass on the goods by determining
the quantity and price for firms at the next level.
To study such models, one needs to analyze subgame perfect equilibria, where each firm
internalizes the decisions of all the firms downstream and compete with all the firms of the
same tier. Another factor that further complicates models of general supply chain networks
is that even the basic concept of tiers is ambiguous because there are often multiple routes
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of different length that goods are traded from the original producers to the consumers.
Our paper studies a model of sequential network game motivated by supply chain network
applications. Our main goal is to understand the existence of an equilibrium and the effect
of network structure on the efficiency of the system.
The length and the number of trading routes are the two main factors that impact the
efficiency of a supply chain network. On one hand, a large variety of options to trade indicates
a high degree of competition. On the other hand, a long trading path causes double, triple
and higher degree marginalization problems. To capture these ideas, we consider a sequential
game theoretical model for a special class of networks, the series parallel graphs. We focus our
analysis on these networks because they are rich enough for studying the trade-off described
above and simple enough for characterizing the equilibrium outcomes. In particular, series
parallel networks have two natural compositions. A parallel composition, which merges two
different sub-networks at the source and the sink, can capture the increase in competition. A
series composition, which attaches two sub-networks sequentially, corresponds to the increase
in the length of trading.
1.1 Our Contribution
We consider a sequential decision model where each firm makes a decision on the buying
quantity from its sellers, and the selling quantity and price to its buyers, given that all
its sellers have made their decisions. The single source producer of the network starts the
decision making with a fixed material cost. The single ending market of the network accepts
all the goods offered by the firms in the last-tier and the market price is an affine decreasing
function of the total quantity of goods. Each firm strives to maximize its utility, assuming
that its downstream buyers make rational decisions. An equilibrium is the collection of
firm decisions such that no firm has the incentive to change its decision, assuming that its
downstream buyers play rationally and the decision of other firms remain unchanged. Our
main results are listed as follows.
• We show a linear time algorithm that finds the unique equilibrium in a series parallel
network. A crucial step is to derive a closed-form expression of the price at each firm
in terms of quantity.
• We show a rich set of equilibrium comparative statics for series parallel networks,
including the firm location advantage of upstream firms and a network-component-
based efficiency analysis.
• We analyze the equilibrium for generalized series parallel networks.
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1.2 Proof Techniques
Equilibrium in Series Parallel Networks. We first observe that the flow conservation
property is satisfied at equilibrium, i.e. inflow equals outflow for each intermediary firm.
The main strategy is to formulate the price offered to each firm in terms of its inflow. Our
first algorithm starts the inductive price computation from the ending market in a reverse
topological order. In the computation of each firm, we take the partial derivative of the
firm’s utility with respect to the buying quantity and obtain a closed-form expression for
three cases. The most interesting one is the case when a single seller has multiple buyers. In
this case, since the utility is a quadratic function of the buying quantity, we formulate a linear
complementarity problem to compute the convex coefficients for each trade from this seller
to her buyers. Once the price-quantity relation is obtained at the source, we compute the
total flow needed for the network. Our second algorithm computes the flow in a topological
order starting from the source producer. When a single seller encounters multiple buyers,
the problem of maximizing the seller utility can be formulated by a linear complementarity
problem, and this problem has an equivalent convex quadratic program. In particular, by
the structure of series parallel networks, the problem can be simplified to a linear system,
and the flow is distributed proportionally to the convex coefficients computed by our first
algorithm. It takes linear time to find an equilibrium and the equilibrium is unique because
the solution of each corresponding convex quadratic program is also unique.
Comparative Statics. For the analysis of firm location advantage, we first obtain a closed-
form expression of each firm’s utility. By this expression, we conclude that an upstream firm
which controls the flow of a downstream firm has at least twice the utility of the downstream
firm. For the network-component-based efficiency analysis, we focus on analyzing the flow
value and social welfare at equilibrium. We show that with the same production cost and
ending market price, locally swapping the order of two components in a series composition
does not change the total flow and social welfare.
Equilibrium Analysis for Generalized Series Parallel Networks. We consider two
extensions with multiple source producers or ending markets. When the generalized series
parallel graph has a single source and multiple markets, we consider a simple network and
observe that the price function of the intermediary firm can be piecewise linear and discon-
tinuous. This enforces the source to apply either the high price or low price strategy. There
can be multiple pure strategy equilibria when both strategies give the source the same utility.
When the generalized series parallel graph has multiple sources and a single ending market,
an equilibrium may not exist.
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1.3 Related work
In a series parallel network, intermediary firms can be considered as Cournot markets at
equilibrium. Thus, the structure of the game is closely related to the literature on Cournot
games in networks. Bimpikis et al. [2014] and Pang et al. [2017], for example, consider a
Cournot game in two sided markets. Nguyen and Kannan [2018] studies Cournot game in
three-tier networks. However, the 2-tier structure of the network in these papers, and the
assumption that only the middle tiers make decision in Nguyen and Kannan [2018] assumes
away the complex sequential decision making considered in this work. Nava [2015] studies
a Cournot game in general networks. However, firms are assumed to make simultaneous
decisions. Simultaneous games are easier to analyze, but do not capture the essential element
of sequential decision making of firms in supply chain networks.
Carr and Karmarkar [2005] considers assembly network where agents make sequential
decision, but assumes a tree network. The analysis for a tree network is substantially simpler,
because each firm has a single downstream node that it can sell the products to. In our game,
each firm needs to make decision on the selling quantity and price to each of its buyer. As
we show, some of the quantities on some of the links can be zero. Such “inactive” links make
the analysis more complicated. Recently, Bimpikis et al. [2019] also considers a sequential
game. The network considered in this paper is however symmetric and its structure is linear.
The focus of Bimpikis et al. [2019] is on the uncertainty of yields, which is different from the
motivation in our paper.
More broadly, this work belongs to the growing literature of network games and their
applications in supply chains, including Corbett and Karmarkar [2001], Federgruen and Hu
[2016], Nguyen et al. [2016], and Nguyen [2017]. These papers, however, are different from
ours in the main focus as well as the modeling approach. Corbett and Karmarkar [2001] for
example, assumes a linear structure of supply chains, Federgruen and Hu [2016] considers
price competition in two-tier networks, while Nguyen et al. [2016]and Nguyen [2017] analyze
bargaining games in networks with simpler structures. The main contribution of our paper
to this line of work is a tractable analysis of sequential competition model in series parallel
graphs, which allows for a richer comparative analysis and deeper understanding of how
basic network elements influence market outcomes.
1.4 Organization
This work is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and the parallel serial
networks together with the compositions. In section 3, we provide the algorithm to compute
the unique equilibrium. In section 4, we analyze how firm location affects individual utility
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and how network structure influences the efficiency. In section 5, we discuss extensions to
other classes of networks and show that pure strategy equilibrium might not exist in general
networks.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce the sequential decision mechanism and the definition of series parallel graph.
2.1 The Model
The Sequential Decision Game Let G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E) be a simple directed acyclic
network that represents an economy where s is the producer firm at the source, t is the sink
market, and V represents intermediary firms. The arcs of G represent the possibility of trade
between two agents. The direction of an arc indicates the direction of trade. The outgoing
end of the arc corresponds to the seller, and the incoming end is the buyer, while s has only
outgoing arcs, and t has only incoming arcs. The remaining vertices i ∈ V representing
intermediary firms has both incoming and outgoing arcs. For a vertex i, B(i) and S(i) are
the sets of agents that can be buyers and sellers in a trade with i, respectively.
Agents start making their decision after the output of their upstream suppliers is deter-
mined. Each firm i decides on how much to buy from each of its sellers, how much to sell to
each of its buyer, and the price to sell to each of its buyer. Formally, i’s decision includes:
• The buying quantity xinki > 0 of arc ki ∈ E for every k ∈ S(i).
• The selling quantity xoutij > 0 of arc ij ∈ E to every j ∈ B(i).
• The selling price pij > 0 of arc ij ∈ E to every j ∈ B(i).
The source producer does not buy any goods, so the decision of s is the selling quantity
xoutsj > 0 and the price psj of arc sj to every j ∈ B(s).
The production cost ps of the source s is given and assumed to be a constant as.
ps = as where as > 0.
The sink node t does not represent a firm, it corresponds to an end market. The price
function pt at sink node t is given and assumed to be an affine decreasing function on the
total amount of goods, Xt, sold to the market t.
pt = at − btXt, where Xt =
∑
i∈S(t)
xinit =
∑
i∈S(t)
xoutit , at > as, and bt > 0.
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at is the demand of the market t. We note that the market must accept all the goods thus
does not have a choice to reject. That is, xinit = x
out
it for each i ∈ S(t). Generally, for a trade
ij ∈ E, the buyer j cannot obtain more than what the seller i offers, thus xinij 6 xoutij . We
assume that each intermediary firm i cannot get goods from any other source besides its
sellers. Firms do not get any value from retaining the goods.
The payoff of the source firm s is
Πs =
∑
j∈B(s)
psjx
in
sj − ps
∑
j∈B(s)
xoutsj . (1)
The utility of an intermediary firm i ∈ V is
Πi =
∑
j∈B(i)
pijx
in
ij −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkix
in
ki. (2)
The formula decomposes the utility function into two terms: the total revenue from j ∈ B(i)
and the total cost of materials from k ∈ S(i).
The timing of the game is as follows. The source producer makes its decision first. A
firm makes its decision on the buying quantity from its upstream, and the selling quantity
and price to its downstream, once all of its sellers have made their decision. When deciding
their accepting quantities to maximize their profits, firm i also needs to take into account
the strategies of both the competing firms and the firms downstream. Firms make their
decisions based on rational expectation of other firms’ strategies.
Equilibrium Characteristics Intuitively, an equilibrium of the sequential decision game
is an assignment of good quantity and price such that no firm is willing to change its deci-
sion after knowing the decision of other non-downstream firms, and assuming that all the
downstream firms also pick their best decisions.
We present two examples to illustrate the equilibrium concept. The first example is a
line network. The source producer controls the amount and price, thus affects the decision
of the intermediary firm.
Example 1 (The Equilibrium of a Line Network)
Consider the following line network.
sps = 1 v t pt = 9−Xt = 9− xoutvt = 9− xinvt
Suppose s offers v xoutsv = 2 and psv = 7, v has to make a decision on x
in
sv and x
out
vt . v
cannot decide pvt because it is already fixed as 9 − xoutvt . The sink market t accepts all the
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goods, so the utility of v is
Πv = (9− xoutvt )xinvt − psvxinsv = (9− xoutvt )xoutvt − 7xinsv.
If v is a rational player who maximizes Πv, then v will sell all the goods it bought, so
xinsv = x
out
vt and Πv = (9− xinsv)xinsv − 7xinsv. By taking the derivative:
dΠv
dxinsv
= 9− 2xinsv − 7 = 0 =⇒ xinsv = 1,
so b will accept 1 out of 2 units of the goods from s.
The utility of s is
Πs = psvx
in
sv − psxoutsv = 7× 1− 1× 2 = 5.
In fact, s is over-selling the goods, it could have set xoutsv = 1 instead such that
Πs = psvx
in
sv − psxoutsv = 7× 1− 1× 1 = 6 > 5.
However, this is not the best strategy for s. If s offers v xoutsv = 2 and psv = 5, by the
same reasoning, the utility of v is
Πv = (9− xinsv)xinsv − 5xinsv.
v tries to maximize Πv:
dΠv
dxinsv
= 9− 2xinsv − 5 = 0 =⇒ xinsv = 2,
so v will accept all the goods from s.
This time, the utility of s is
Πs = psvx
in
sv − psxoutsv = 5× 2− 1× 2 = 8,
and s is better off. This is the optimal strategy for s. In summary, the equilibrium is
psv x
out
sv x
in
sv x
out
vt
5 2 2 2
The second example illustrates the competition between two intermediary firms. The
source producer controls the quantity and price, thus affects the decisions of its two down-
stream firms.
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Example 2 (The Equilibrium with Two Intermediary Firms)
Consider the following network.
ps = 1 s
u
v
t pt = 7−Xt = 7− x− y
xoutsu
xoutsv
x
y
Suppose the decision of s is
psu psv x
out
su x
out
sv
3 4 1 1
and u and v are rational firms, i.e. they will sell all the goods they bought to maximize their
payoff. For simplicity, let x = xinsu and y = x
in
sv. The utilities of u and v are
Πu = (7− x− y)x− 3x and Πv = (7− x− y)y − 4y.
By taking the derivative, we have
dΠu
dx
= 4− 2x− y and dΠv
dy
= 3− x− 2y.
We claim that the best decision of u and v is x = 1 and y = 1. Πv is a concave function
so it is maximized when dΠv
dy
= 0, which implies the best response to x = 1 is y = 1. We
observe that Πu is also concave. Πu is maximized when
dΠu
dx
= 0. However, when y = 1, x
cannot be 3
2
since x 6 xoutsu = 1. While y = 1 and x ∈ [0, 1], Πu is an increasing function, so
the best response to y = 1 is x = 1.
The utility of s for this decision is
Πs = psux+ psvy − ps(xoutsu + xoutsv ) = 3× 1 + 4× 1− 1× (1 + 1) = 5.
Given that psu = 3 and psv = 4, there is a better quantity decision for s. We recall that
Πu and Πv are both concave, so it suffices to show that
dΠu
dx
and dΠv
dx
are both zeros. This
happens when x = 5
3
and y = 2
3
. If xoutsu =
5
3
and xoutsv =
2
3
, then u and v will buy all the goods
from s and the utility of s is
Πs = psux+ psvy − ps(xoutsu + xoutsv ) = 3×
5
3
+ 4× 2
3
− 1× (5
3
+
2
3
) =
16
3
.
However, this is not the best decision of s. The equilibrium for this network is as follows.
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psu psv x
out
su x
out
sv x y
4 4 1 1 1 1
One can verify that Πv and Πv are concave and the derivatives are zeros. The payoff of s is
Πs = psux+ psvy − ps(xoutsu + xoutsv ) = 4× 1 + 4× 1− 1× (1 + 1) = 6.
We observe that the best strategy for each firm i ∈ V is to always sell as much as bought
since it cannot benefit from paying more for those unsold goods. At the selling side, suppose
firm i is willing to offer xoutij quantity of goods to firm j, but part of the goods got rejected,
i.e. xinij < x
out
ij . This can never happen in an equilibrium, because i will be better off by
rejecting xoutij − xinij amount of goods from its upstream before selling.
The next observation lists the properties of supplying quantities at an equilibrium.
Observation 2.1 (Equilibrium Flow Conservation) An equilibrium satisfies:
1. xoutij = x
in
ij for each ij ∈ E.
2.
∑
k∈S(i) x
in
ki =
∑
j∈B(i) x
out
ij , i.e. inflow is equal to outflow for each firm i ∈ V .
Now we are ready to state the formal definition of an equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 An equilibrium is a set of strategies including:
1. the strategy of the source producer s: poutsj and x
out
sj for j ∈ B(s), and
2. the strategy of each intermediary firm i ∈ V : poutij (if j 6= t, otherwise poutij = pt =
at − btXt), xoutij for j ∈ B(s), and xinki for k ∈ S(i)
such that
1. xinij = x
out
ij for each ij ∈ E, i.e. j accepts all the goods i offers, and
2. for each firm i ∈ {s}∪V , i does not have the incentive to change its strategy for a better
payoff, assuming that each descendant firm of i plays the best strategy that maximizes
its payoff, and the strategy of non-descendant firms of i remain the same.
For later notations, at an equilibrium, we denote xij as the flow of arc ij, i.e. xij = x
out
ij =
xinij , and no longer use x
in
ij and x
out
ij . Meanwhile, since each firm accepts all the offers and
sells everything they bought, we denote this sum of flow as Xi :=
∑
k∈S(i) xki =
∑
j∈B(i) xij .
The utility of firm i in (2) becomes
Πi =
∑
j∈B(i)
pijxij −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki (3)
9
and the utility of source firm s in (1) becomes
Πs =
∑
j∈B(s)
psjxsj − ps
∑
j∈B(s)
xsj . (4)
For flow activities, an arc ij ∈ E is active if xij > 0, and inactive if xij = 0. For each
firm i ∈ V and active arcs ki ∈ E and ij ∈ E, pki 6 pij. That is, the buying price should
not exceed the selling price. Otherwise, i could have been better off by rejecting some goods
from k and choosing not to offer the same amount of goods to j.
Observation 2.2 For every ki ∈ E and ij ∈ E that are active, the price at an equilibrium
satisfies pki 6 pij.
To define equilibrium uniqueness, we require the set of active arcs to be unique, as well
as the flow and price of each active arc. The prices of inactive trades, on the other hand,
can be arbitrary since they do not contribute to the seller revenue.
Definition 2.2 An equilibrium of a network G is unique if the set of active arcs is unique,
as well as the flow and price of each active arc.
2.2 Series Parallel Graphs
General Series Parallel Graphs We consider the case when G is a series parallel graph
(SPG). The networks in Example 1 and 2 are both SPGs. Our main goal is to compute the
equilibrium in networks that belong to this special graph family. This class of networks is
well studied and has several applications in graph theory (see for example Duffin [1965]).
For completeness, we provide a formal definition as follows.
Definition 2.3 (SPG) A single-source-and-sink SPG is a graph that can be constructed
by a sequence of series and parallel compositions starting from a set of copies of a single-arc
graph, where:
1. Series composition of X and Y : given two SPGs X with source sX and sink tX , and
Y with source sY and sink tY , form a new graph G = S(X, Y ) by identifying s = sX ,
tX = sY , and t = tY .
2. Parallel composition of X and Y : given two SPGs X with source sX and sink tX ,
and Y with source sY and sink tY , form a new graph G = P (X, Y ) by identifying
s = sX = sY and t = tX = tY .
Shortcut-free Series Parallel Graphs We start with the definition of shortcuts.
Definition 2.4 Given an SPG G = (V,E), let i, j ∈ V . Consider a path lij = (i, v1, ..., vk, j)
from node i to node j. If there is an arc ij ∈ E, then we say ij is a shortcut of lij, or ij
dominates path lij.
Definition 2.5 An SPG is shortcut-free if it has no shortcuts, i.e. there is no path domi-
nated by an arc.
Node k is a parent node of i if there is a directed path from k to i. The set of parent
nodes of i is denoted as P (i). Similarly, we can define child nodes and the set of children
C(i). Given a shortcut-free SPG, if we consider the relation between direct (or adjacent)
parent and child i and j, where ij ∈ E, there are three possibilities1:
• Single seller and single buyer, |S(j)| = |B(i)| = 1. (SS)
• Multiple sellers and single buyer, |S(j)| > 2, |B(i)| = 1. (MS)
• Single seller and multiple buyers, |S(j)| = 1, |B(i)| > 2. (SM)
i j
SS
i1
i2
im
i
j
MS
j1
j2
jm
i j
SM
Sometimes there are multiple paths from a parent node to one of its children, we call
these paths disjoint if they do not have any common intermediary nodes, that is, all nodes
except the starting and the ending ones are different. Base on this definition, we can define
the merging nodes with respect to node i.
Definition 2.6 (Self-merging Child Node) Node j ∈ C(i) is a self-merging child
node of i if there are disjoint paths from i to j. The set of such nodes j is termed CS(i).
Definition 2.7 (Parent-merging Child Node) Node j ∈ C(i) is a parent-merging
child node of i, if there exists a node k ∈ P (i), such that there are disjoint paths from
k to j. The set of such nodes j is denoted as CP (i).
1Multiple sellers and multiple buyers case does not exist in shortcut-free SPGs, we refer the proof to
Appendix A.1
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For ij ∈ E, we introduce the set of special self-merging child nodes of i and its direct
child j as CT (i, j) := CS(i) ∩ C(j)\CP (i). This notation helps us capture the “internal”
merging nodes that are responsible for the selling price and quantity offered to i.
Observation 2.3 An SPG has the following properties:
1. CP (s) = CP (t) = ∅.
2. In the SS case for ij ∈ E, CP (j) = CP (i).
3. In the SM case for ij ∈ E, CP (j) = CP (i) ⊔ CT (i, j).
4. In the MS case for ij ∈ E, CP (i) = CP (j) ⊔ {j}.
We note that ⊔ stands for disjoint set union. We show Example 5 in the appendix for
merging child node sets.
3 Equilibrium Computation
We present two algorithms to compute the equilibrium quantity and price for each arc. We
start with shortcut-free SPGs and show that all arcs are active at equilibrium. To do so,
we first derive a closed-form relation between the quantity and price offered to the firms at
equilibrium via a backward algorithm. Then, we show that the unique optimal quantity and
price offered to each firm can be solved following the decision sequence from the source to
sink by the closed-form relation. For SPGs with shortcuts, we show that the trade on paths
dominated by shortcuts are inactive. Thus, the equilibrium for an SPG with shortcuts can
be found by the same algorithm after removing dominated paths.
3.1 Shortcut-free Series Parallel Graphs
Equilibrium Price Computation. A key characteristic of the equilibrium is that all
edges are active when there are no shortcuts. The equilibrium price has a closed-form
expression in terms of the equilibrium quantity based on the structure of the SPG.
Theorem 3.1 Given a shortcut-free SPG G, at an equilibrium, all arcs are active. For each
firm i ∈ V , each seller k ∈ S(i) offers i the same price pi, and the following relation holds
pi = at − biXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
where bi for each i ∈ V ∪ {s} is a positive constant that only depends on the structure of G.
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Theorem 3.1 shows a concise way to present the price and quantity relation at equilibrium.
The high level strategy for deriving the closed-form expression is via a backward induction
starting from the sink market t. In order to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium, we
consider the fact that the upstream firms make their decision based on the best decision of
the downstream. Since the price of the sink market t is an affine decreasing function, we
can inductively show that the utility of each intermediary firm is a concave function of the
quantity. We observe that the derivative of the utility with respect to the quantity of a trade
cannot be positive since otherwise the upstream firm can be better off by raising the price.
On the other hand, the derivative with respect to the quantity of an active trade must be zero.
This is because the upstream firms assume that the downstream firms make their decision
to maximize their utility, which implies the derivative is zero. By this observation, we derive
a linear complementarity problem, and show that the best price offered to the downstream
is an affine decreasing function of the quantity. The proof is given in Appendix A.2. By
adapting the main equations in that proof, we introduce Algorithm 1 to compute the price
at equilibrium in terms of the quantity.
Algorithm 1 starts from the sink market t. In each iteration, given the downstream bj
where j ∈ B(i), we compute bi and this can be done in O(deg+(i)) time where deg+(i) is
the out-degree of i. The calculation is in a reverse topological order. Particularly, in the SM
case, we store the convex coefficients of each downstream node j ∈ B(i) which is used later
in the equilibrium quantity computation. The number of the bi computation is bounded by
O(|V |). Therefore, it takes linear time to compute the price function in terms of quantity
by Algorithm 1. When s is reached, we already have ps = at − bsXs = as since CP (s) = ∅.
Eventually, Xs =
at−as
bs
so the expected price of s meets the given production cost. We show
Example 6 in the appendix for the price calculation by Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 : Price Function Computation (Backward)
Input: A shortcut-free SPG G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E), the price function pt = at − btXt, and the
source production cost ps = as.
Output: The equilibrium price function pi for each i ∈ V , the convex coefficients αj for arc
ij where j ∈ B(i) in the SM case, and the source flow Xs.
1: Starting from t, given the downstream buyer(s) j’s price function pj , compute the up-
stream seller(s) i’s price case by case in a reverse topological order:
• For the SS case,
bi = 2bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl. (SS)
• For the MS case, for each seller i,
bi = bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl. (MS)
• For the simple SM case (|CS(i)| = 1)2, suppose bj was calculated for all j ∈ B(i),
bi =
2∑
j∈B(i)
1
bj
+ 2
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl. (Simple SM)
For each j ∈ B(i), assign the convex coefficient αj =
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
b
j′
to arc ij.
2: Set the price function at seller i: pi = at − biXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl.
3: if seller i is the source s then
4: Set Xs =
at−as
bs
.
5: return
Equilibrium Quantity Computation. We consider shortcut-free SPGs. After having
the closed-form relation between the equilibrium price and quantity, we present an algorithm
that finds the unique equilibrium. Consider the quantity decision for firm i to its downstream
buyers j ∈ B(i). Suppose firm i only has one buyer, i.e., |B(i)| = 1, by Observation 2.1,
inflow equals outflow at firm i, and firm j will accept all the offer from i, formally, xij = Xi.
Hence, in the following analysis, we focus on the nontrivial case, the SM case, when firm has
2If |CS(i)| > 2, the computation of bi is more complicated, the detail is provided in Appendix A.2. We
also show Example 7 for this case in the appendix.
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multiple downstream buyers, i.e., |B(i)| > 2. How to assign the goods to different buyers so
that the utility of firm i is maximized? We recall that by Theorem 3.1, all arcs are active
and for each firm j ∈ V , pij = pj for each i ∈ S(j). Therefore, the utility of i in (3) becomes
Πi =
∑
j∈B(i)
pjxij − pi
∑
j∈B(i)
xij . (5)
Again by Theorem 3.1, the price function of seller j is
pj = at − bjxij −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl (6)
since Xj = xij in the SM case.
The utility of firm i in (5) is concave. At the equilibrium, if xij > 0, then
∂Πi
∂xij
= 0;
if xij = 0, then
∂Πi
∂xij
6 0. Therefore, solving the optimal decision for firm i is equivalent
to solving the following linear complementarity problem (LCP) with variables xij where
j ∈ B(i). 

∑
j∈B(i)
∂Πi
∂xij
xij = 0,
∂Πi
∂xij
6 0 ∀j ∈ B(i),
xij > 0 ∀j ∈ B(i).
(LCP)
To solve this feasibility problem LCP and find the optimal allocation to the downstream
firm j, we take the derivative of Πi with respect to xij and obtain
∂Πi
∂xij
= pj +
∑
h∈B(i)
∂ph
∂xij
xih − pi. (7)
The second term of (7) can be expanded as
∑
h∈B(i)
∂ph
∂xij
xih = −bjxij −
∑
h∈B(i)
(
∂
∑
l∈CP (h)
blXl
∂xij
)xih
= −bjxij −
∑
h∈B(i)
(
∑
l∈CP (h)∩C(j)
bl)xih
= −bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXi.
(8)
The second equality holds because Xl includes xij only when l is a child of j. The third
equality holds by rearranging and summing the inflow value of the merging nodes. Plug (6)
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and (8) back into (7), we get
∂Πi
∂xij
= at − 2bjxij −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXi − ciXi − pi
= at − 2bjxij − 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl − consti
(9)
where
consti := (
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl + ci)Xi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl + pi
is defined in terms of Xi, Xl where l ∈ CP (i), and pi. These values were determined by the
upstream buyers thus are regarded as constants to i. The second equality of (9) holds by
Observation 2.3: CP (j) = CP (i) ⊔ CT (i, j).
We introduce a convex quadratic program (CQP) to solve LCP:
min
x,X
∑
j∈B(i)
bjx
2
ij +
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
blX
2
l
subject to at − 2bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
2blXl 6 consti ∀j ∈ B(i),
xij > 0 ∀j ∈ B(i).
(CQP)
By examining the KKT conditions of the quadratic program, each variable Xl satisfies
Xl =
∑
j|l∈C(j) xij where j ∈ B(i), which fits the definition of Xl. The feasibility of LCP also
holds. The proof of Lemma 3.1 is provided in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 3.1 Problem LCP is equivalent to the convex optimization problem CQP, and the
solution is unique.
After the equilibrium price and quantity relation function is computed by Algorithm 1,
by solving CQP directly, we have the optimal decision of each firm in polynomial time. By
Theorem 3.1, ∂Πi
∂xij
= 0 since all the arcs are active. This is equivalent to solving a linear
system. The algorithm can be sped up further by distributing the flow from i to j ∈ B(i)
proportionally to the convex coefficients pre-computed in Algorithm 1. Besides, each pj has
the same value so that i has no preference over whom to sell to. We refer the proof of
Lemma 3.2 to Appendix A.23 (the SM case).
Lemma 3.2 For the SM case, Πi is maximized by distributing the flow to j ∈ B(i) propor-
tionally to the convex coefficients pre-computed in Algorithm 1. Besides, each pj has the
same value.
3Lemma 3.2 is used to find the price and the convex coefficients for the SM case in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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By Lemma 3.2, we introduce Algorithm 2 that takes linear time to find the equilibrium
price and quantity. The algorithm starts from the source s and distributes the flow to
the downstream firms in a topological order. We show Example 8 in the appendix for an
equilibrium flow computation by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 : SPG Flow and Price Computation (Forward)
Input: A shortcut-free SPG G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E), the market price function pt = at − btXt,
and the source production cost ps = as.
Output: The equilibrium flow assignment xij for ij ∈ E and price pi for i ∈ V .
1: Get Xs, the price function pi for each i ∈ V , and the convex coefficients in the SM case
by running Algorithm 1.
2: Assign quantity and price according to a topological order as the following:
• For the single buyer case, the flow to the buyer is the sum of the upstream flow.
• For the single seller and multiple buyers case, assign the downstream flow propor-
tionally to the convex coefficients.
• Set the price accordingly to the quantity by the price function for each case.
3: if the buyer is sink t then
4: return
3.2 General Series Parallel Graphs
Suppose the given SPG G = (V,E) has a shortcut ij ∈ E that dominates a path lij =
(i, v1, ..., vk, j). When the price pj is a decreasing function of Xj, i always prefers selling to
j directly than through the intermediary firms along the path lij in order to obtain better
utility. We refer the proof details to Appendix A.4 and show Example 9 in the appendix
that illustrates an equilibrium with inactive trades in an SPG with a shortcut.
Lemma 3.3 Given an SPG, at an equilibrium, if ij ∈ E is a shortcut of a path lij and the
price pj is a decreasing function of Xj, then there is no trade on lij, i.e. all the arcs on the
path lij are inactive.
In the price computation for shortcut-free SPGs, we show by induction that pj is an
affine decreasing function of Xj . By Lemma 3.3, given a general SPG, we can remove the
dominated paths and obtain a shortcut-free SPG. The equilibrium quantity and price can
be found by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in linear time. The uniqueness of equilibrium
can be proved by encoding this problem into LCP and its corresponding CQP has a unique
solution. We conclude by the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.2 There exists a linear time algorithm to solve the equilibrium quantity and
price for SPGs, and the equilibrium is unique.
4 Structural Analysis
We present some structural analyses, including the relation between firm location and utility,
and the influence and invariants of different SPG component compositions on the equilibrium.
We consider shortcut-free SPGs throughout this section.
4.1 Firm Location and Individual Utility
This section focuses on firm’s utility at equilibrium. Specifically, how does the position of a
firm in the network influence its utility at equilibrium? The following example is useful to
address this question.
Example 3 (Firm Utility in a Line Network)
sps = 0 a t pt = 1−Xtx x
The price at firm a is pa = 1−2x and at producer s is ps = 1−4x. Therefore, the utility
at firm a is Πa = (pt − pa)x = x2 and at producer s is Πs = 2x2 = 2Πa.
The example above shows an intuition of the location advantage, that the firm closer to
the source may have higher utility than its downstream buyers. However, this is not always
true, especially when there are strong competition among upstream buyers (i.e. the MS
case). The upstream firm who controls all the flow of its downstream firm has a relatively
better utility at equilibrium. Therefore, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.1 (Dominating Parent) i is a dominating parent of j if all the path from
source s to j must go through i.
Before analyzing the utility relation between a dominating parent and a dominated child,
let us first focus on individual utility. By using the coefficient relation between the buyer
i and the seller j ∈ B(i) as in equation SS, MS, and Simple SM, we show the closed-form
expression of the utility in Lemma 4.3. The proof is provided in Appendix B.1.
Lemma 4.1
Πi =
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i ∀i ∈ V ∪ {s}.
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From Lemma 4.1, we show a closed-form expression of the price offered by the source,
which is irrelevant to the structure of the supply chain network. Then, we show the double
utility rule of a dominating parent.
The utility of the source is
Πs =
1
2
bsX
2
s =
1
2
bsXs
at − as
bs
=
at − as
2
Xs.
By Lemma 3.2, s offers its buyers the same price at equilibrium. Let p = pj for j ∈ B(s),
we have
Πs =
at − as
2
Xs = (p− as)Xs =⇒ p = at − as
2
.
Proposition 4.1 At equilibrium, the source offers the price at−as
2
to its buyers.
We prove the following propositions which show the location advantage of a dominating
parent. We show that in the SS and the SM case, the seller benefits a lot from the competition
among the buyer side, and the proof is provided in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 4.2 In the SS and the SM case, the utility of the seller is at least twice the
utility of the buyers’ total utility.
If a firm controls all the flow of another child firm in the supply chain, then its utility is
at least twice as much as its child. We refer the proof to Appendix B.3.
Proposition 4.3 If firm i is a dominating parent of firm j, then firm i has at least twice
the utility of firm j.
To sum up, a dominating parent always has better utility and the double utility rule
always holds, which demonstrates the great value of controlling the upstream trades.
4.2 Network Efficiency and Component Composition
To measure how firms would benefit from the network, we may care about not only the flow
value but also the social welfare. The social welfare is the total utility of the source and
intermediary firms plus the consumer surplus:
SW (G) =
∑
i∈V ∪{s}
Πi +
1
2
btX
2
t
=
1
2
∑
i∈V ∪{s}
(bi +
∑
k∈CP (i)
bk)X
2
i +
1
2
btX
2
t .
(10)
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The social welfare can also be interpreted as the product of the flow and the price differ-
ence between the sink and the source (the producer surplus), plus the consumer surplus:
SW (G) = (at − as − btXs)Xs + 1
2
btX
2
t
= (at − as − bt
2
Xs)Xs.
(11)
The criteria of interest are the welfare efficiency and flow efficiency defined as follows.
Definition 4.2 (Welfare Efficiency) A supply chain network is more welfare efficient
if it provides a larger social welfare at equilibrium.
Definition 4.3 (Flow Efficiency) A supply chain network is more flow efficient if it
provides a larger flow at equilibrium.
We examine the relation between flow efficiency, welfare efficiency, and the structure of
an SPG. Suppose the given SPG G is constructed by series and parallel compositions on
SPGs G1, G2, ..., and Gn, then Gi where i = 1, ..., n are the components of G. Since we
assume that G is shortcut-free, there are no shortcuts in the components of G as well. The
flow efficiency and welfare efficiency of a supply chain is highly related to its components,
and we define the component factor as the following.
Definition 4.4 (Component Factor) The component factor of an SPG Y is
λ(Y ) :=
bsY
btY
.
The component factor measures the enlargement of the decreasing linear coefficient at
the equilibrium price of an SPG Y . Y will have a higher flow value if its component factor
λ(Y ) is small. The following theorem shows that the component factor is irrelevant to btX .
The proof is provided in Appendix B.4.
Lemma 4.2 λ(Y ) > 2 is a constant that is only relevant to the graph structure of Y .
Now we can rewrite social welfare in terms of λ(G)
SW (G) = (at − as − bt
2
Xs)Xs
= (at − as − bt
2
at − as
λ(G)bt
)
at − as
λ(G)bt
= (at − as)2(1− 1
2λ(G)
)
1
λ(G)bt
.
(12)
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With fixed sink price function at− btXt and source production cost as, SW (G) is a function
of λ(G). By Lemma 4.2, λ(Y ) > 2, so SW (G) is maximized when λ(G) = 2, and it is a
decreasing function of λ(G) when λ(G) ∈ [2,∞). The flow Xs is also a decreasing function
of λ(G). G is the single edge network if and only if λ(G) = 2. Therefore, the single edge
network is the most flow and welfare efficient.
Proposition 4.4 The single edge network is the most flow and welfare efficient network.
If the network is fixed, we have the following. The proof is provided in Appendix B.5.
Proposition 4.5 With a fixed network structure, if the demand at the market increases or
the cost at the source decreases, then the market is more flow and welfare efficient and the
utility of each individual firm increases.
Consider the order of series composition on two SPGs Y and Z. By Lemma 4.2,
λ(S(Y, Z)) = λ(Y )λ(Z) = λ(S(Z, Y ))
which implies that swapping the order of two components in a series composition does not
change the component factor.
Lemma 4.3 Given two SPGs Y and Z, λ(S(Y, Z)) = λ(S(Z, Y )).
We also present a closed-form expression of the component factor λ(P (Y, Z)) after the
parallel composition in terms of λ(Y ) and λ(Z), assuming that P (Y, Z) is shortcut-free. We
refer the proof of Lemma 4.4 to Appendix B.6.
Lemma 4.4 Given SPGs Y and Z such that P (Y, Z) does not have any shortcuts,
λ(P (Y, Z)) =
(λ(Y )− 2)(λ(Z)− 2)
λ(Y ) + λ(Z)− 4 + 2.
By Lemma 4.3 and 4.4, during the construction of an SPG, the component factor remains
unchanged after a parallel composition of two SPGs with unchanged component factor.
Switching the order of two local components in a series composition does not change the
global component factor. Hence with fixed sink price function and production cost, by (12),
the flow and welfare efficiency remain unchanged after the swap. Since the flow remain the
same and by Proposition 4.1, the source offers the same price to its buyers regardless of the
network structure, the source utility is unchanged. We conclude by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.6 Suppose the given SPG G is constructed by series and parallel com-
positions on SPGs G1, G2, ..., and Gn, which includes a step S(Gi, Gj) for i 6= j and
i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Let G′ be an SPG with the same construction as G, except that S(Gi, Gj)
is replaced by S(Gj, Gi). Then, λ(G) = λ(G
′). With the same sink price function and
production cost, the flow efficiency, welfare efficiency, and source utility remain the same.
5 Equilibrium in Generalized Series Parallel Graphs
We discuss the equilibrium properties in the extension cases when the series parallel graph
has multiple sources or sinks. In particular, we show that:
• Single-source-and-multiple-sinks SPG: Price function of a firm may be piecewise linear
and discontinuous under simple settings. There may exist multiple equilibria.
• Multiple-sources-and-single-sink SPG: An equilibrium may not exist.
5.1 Single Source and Multiple Sinks
A series parallel graph with a single source and multiple sinks (SMSPG) is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (SMSPG) G is a single-source-and-multiple-sink SPG if it can be con-
structed by deleting the sink node of an SPG and setting the adjacent nodes of the sink as
the new sink nodes. The set of sinks is denoted as T .
First we consider a special case that all the markets have the same demand, then all the
markets are active at equilibrium, i.e. every market has positive incoming flow. The proof
is similar to Theorem 3.2 and we provide the sketch in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 5.1 Given an SMSPG, if all the markets have the same demand, then there
exists a unique equilibrium that can be found in polynomial time.
With different demand at for t ∈ T , the markets may be inactive, i.e. the incoming
quantity is zero. For example:
Example 4 (Markets Activities)
s
t1
v
t2
t3
ps = 1
pt1 = 2−Xt1
pt2 = 3−Xt2
pt3 = 11−Xt3
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Since at1 > ps, the market t1 is active. Suppose markets t2 and t3 are both active at equilib-
rium, and s offers v x+ y units of goods with price pv, then v will buy all the goods from s.
Suppose v sells x to t2 and y to t3, then the utility of v is
Πv = (3− x)x+ (11− y)y − pv(x+ y).
By taking the derivative of Πv with respect to x and y, we have
∂Πv
∂x
= 3− 2x− pv and ∂Πv
∂y
= 11− 2y − pv
so Πv is maximized when
pv = 3− 2x = 11− 2y =⇒ pv = 7− (x+ y) = 7−Xv.
When source s makes a decision, the flow xst1 and xsv can be handled independently,
the optimal decision that maximizes the utility (7 − Xv)Xv of s from v is Xv = 3.5 and
pv = 3.5 > at2 = 3, which contradicts to the assumption that market t2 is active. Therefore,
market t2 is inactive, even though at2 > at1 .
The above example is against the intuition that the market with higher demand is more
likely to be active (t2 is inactive while t1 is). While the truth is not only market demand,
but also the competitors and network structure have influence on market activity. Namely,
market t2 is inactive because it has a longer supply chain than t1 and a strong competition
between t3. As a result, it is less favorable than t1 and t3.
The market behavior of SMSPG is usually intractable. In particular, we focus on supply
chain networks of the shape in Figure 1. Based on the activity status of the markets, we
introduce two types of strategies for the upstream firm.
Definition 5.2 (Low Price Strategy) Firm processes relatively large quantity of goods
at a relatively low price, such that all the markets are active.
Definition 5.3 (High Price Strategy) Firm processes relatively small quantity of goods
at a relatively high price, such that some markets are inactive.
The firm plays its strategy to maximize its utility. Because of various choice of strategies,
the price function might be piecewise linear and discontinuous. Furthermore, some counter-
intuitive results will occur, i.e. the increase of demand may result in the decrease of total
flow and social welfare (comparing to Proposition 4.5). To understand these differences, it
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is helpful to consider an example as in Figure 1, where the two supply chain networks have
identical structure with different market demands.
supply chain 1:
sps = 7 v
t1
t2
pt1 = 19− x
pt2 = 12− y
Xv
x
y
supply chain 2:
sps = 7 v
t1
t2
pt1 = 20− x
pt2 = 12− y
Xv
x
y
Figure 1: Multiple Sinks Supply Networks
Intuitively, supply chain 2 with higher market demand should have larger flow and social
welfare. However, supply chain 1 is more flow and welfare efficient. The equilibrium price
functions at s and v are shown in Figure 2. We note that the source firm s has two strategies
when ps = 7, and both low and high price strategies are feasible. Interestingly, when at1 = 20,
the utility of s is maximized by choosing high price strategy and only market t1 is active.
However, when demand at market t1 drops, the low price strategy is preferred by s.
Xv
pv
pv = 20− 2Xv
pv = 16−Xv
4
12
Xv
ps
ps = 20− 4Xv
ps = 16− 2Xv
4
4
8
Figure 2: Piecewise Linear Price Functions of Supply Chain 2
By fixing the demand at market t2 and adjusting the demand at market t1 (at1), Figure 3
shows the results of the source utility, consumer surplus, total flow and social welfare. The
intersecting point at at1 ≈ 19.07 shows that increasing demand at market t1 hurts the supply
chain efficiency. When at1 is the intersecting point then there are multiple equilibria since s
has no preference between the high price and low price strategy. Besides, at1 is feasible only
in the interval (12, 22]. The calculation details are provided in Example 10 in the appendix.
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at1
Πs
12 17 22
10
20
30
19.07
(a) Source Utility v.s. at1
at1
CS
12 17 22
5
10
15
(b) Consumer Surplus v.s. at1
at1
Xs
12 17 22
2
4
6
(c) Flow v.s. at1
at1
SW
12 17 22
20
40
60
(d) Social Welfare v.s. at1
Figure 3: High Price Strategy (red) v.s. Low Price Strategy (blue)
Proposition 5.2 An SMSPG may have multiple equilibria.
Remark. For supply chain networks of the shape in Figure 1,
• The low price strategy always gives a higher flow value than the high price strategy.
• When the demand difference between two markets is small enough, the low price strat-
egy gives better utility for the source. When the difference is large enough, the high
price strategy gives better utility for the source.
• The low price strategy always produces higher social welfare.
In short, the low price strategy is preferred by s if the demand difference is not large. Be-
sides, with the low price strategy, everyone is usually better off. We refer more interpretation
and detailed calculations of these results to Appendix C.2.
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5.2 Multiple Sources and Single Sink
The extension of SPG with multiple sinks is defined similarly to Definition 5.1.
Definition 5.4 (MSSPG) G is a multiple-source-and-single-sink SPG if it can be con-
structed by deleting the source node of an SPG and setting the adjacent nodes of the source
as the new source nodes. The set of sources is denoted as S.
Assume that the source producers make their decision simultaneously, an equilibrium
may not exist. We show Example 11 in the appendix.
Proposition 5.3 An equilibrium in an MSSPG may not exist.
6 Conclusion
We consider a model of sequential competition in supply chain networks. Our main contri-
bution is that when the network is series parallel, the model is tractable and allows a rich
set of comparative analysis. In particular, we provide a linear time algorithm to compute
the equilibrium and the algorithm helps us study the influence of the network to the total
flow and social welfare of the equilibrium.
Slightly extending the network structure beyond series parallel graphs with a single source
and multiple sinks (SMSPG) makes the model intractable. The first open problem is to design
an efficient algorithm that verifies if an SMSPG has an equilibrium and finds one if it exists.
The main challange is the piecewise-linearity and the discontinuity of the price function for
intermediary firms. This problem may be computationally intractable but it is unclear what
a reasonable proof strategy would be.
Another open problem is to efficiently find an equilibrium in general DAGs with a single
source and a single sink. The trades can be inactive for shortcut-free DAGs as shown in
Example 12 in the appendix. We conjecture that there is always an equilibrium and the active
trades form a shortcut-free SPG. A natural approach is to compute the price function in a
reverse topological order from the sink inductively. However, this enforces one to solve LCPs
that correspond to the firms, where the LCPs of the upstream firms are derived from the
LCPs of the downstream firms. Solving the LCP system requires determining inactive trades
where the number of combination of active and inactive trades is exponential. Therefore, a
potential strategy to show computational intractability is a reduction from an LCP based or
a quadratic programming problem.
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Appendix
A Proofs in Section 3
A.1 Proof of The Nonexistence of the MM Case
Proof. The Multiple sellers and multiple buyers (MM) case is |B(i)| > 2 and |S(j)| > 2 for
ij ∈ E:
i1
i2
i
j1
j2
j
MM
The MM case is impossible in a shortcut-free SPG, and this can be proved by induction.
By definition, any SPG can be constructed by series and parallel composition:
• Series composition: the MM case will not appear after series composition.
• Parallel composition: by checking the merging source and sink, one can see that the
MM case will not appear either, unless there is a shortcut between the source and sink.
Therefore, the MM case does not happen in a shortcut-free SPG.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 Given a shortcut-free SPG G, at an equilibrium, all arcs are active. For each
firm i ∈ V , each seller k ∈ S(i) offers i the same price pi, and the following relation holds
pi = at − biXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
where bi for each i ∈ V ∪ {s} is a positive constant that only depends on the structure of G.
Proof. Our strategy is to start from the sink t and argue inductively via reverse topological
traversal that the price proposed to i must be an affine decreasing function of Xi. We note
that the computation is always under the flow reservation condition by Observation 2.1.
Starting from the Sink t. We start with the behavior of the direct upstream firms of
sink t. For a firm i ∈ S(t), if arc it belongs to the SS case, then the utility of i is
Πi = (at − btxit)xit −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki
= (at − bt
∑
k∈S(i)
xki)
∑
k∈S(i)
xki −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki.
28
pki given by the selling firms are regarded as constants to i. Πi is a concave function. By
taking the derivative of Πi with respect to xki, we have
∂Πi
∂xki
= at − 2bt
∑
k∈S(i)
xki − pki.
The price and quantity at equilibrium is a solution of the following linear complementarity
problem. Intuitively, ∂Πi
∂xki
> 0 cannot happen since otherwise k could have raised the price
pki such that
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0. This makes i accept all the goods from k and k would obtain a higher
payoff, which contradicts the equilibrium condition. If ∂Πi
∂xki
< 0, then k will not offer any
goods to i so xki = 0 since the payoff of i will decrease if i accepts some goods from k.

∑
k∈S(i)
∂Πi
∂xki
xki = 0,
∂Πi
∂xki
6 0 ∀k ∈ S(i),
xki > 0 ∀k ∈ S(i).
(Reverse LCP)
When ki is active, pki is such that
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0. Therefore, for an active arc ki,
pki = pi = at − 2bt
∑
k∈S(i)
xki.
If arc it belongs to the MS case, then the utility of i is
Πi = (at − bt
∑
j∈S(t)
xjt)
∑
k∈S(i)
xki −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki.
pki and xjt where j 6= i are regarded as constants to i so that regardless of some fixed pki
and xjt, i is not willing to change its decision at equilibrium. Πi is a concave function. By
taking the derivative of Πi with respect to xki, we have
∂Πi
∂xki
= at − bt
∑
k∈S(i)
xki − bt
∑
j∈S(t)
xjt − pki.
By a similar argument as before, the price and quantity at equilibrium is a solution of
Reverse LCP. When ki is active, pki is such that
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0. Therefore, for an active arc ki,
pki = pi = at − bt
∑
k∈S(i)
xki − bt
∑
j∈S(t)
xjt = at − biXi − btXt.
Before reaching the SM Case. The same procedure as before can be inductively re-
peated whenever we meet an MS or SS case by the reverse topological traversal from t. Given
the fact that the downstream price must be an affine decreasing function of the inflow of the
parent merging child nodes, the derivative of the firm utility with respect to the quantity
decision variables must always be zero whenever the quantity is positive.
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Before reaching the SM case during the reverse topological traversal from t, consider firm
i ∈ V . By inductive hypothesis, suppose for each arc xij > 0,
pij = pj = at − bjXj −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl.
We note that the flow on ki merges to the nodes l ∈ CP (j) and j, so ∂Xj∂xki =
∂Xl
∂xki
= 1.
Consider arc ki, if ki is the SS case or the MS case, then the utility of i is
Πi = pjxij −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki
= pj
∑
k∈S(i)
xki −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki.
If ki is the SS case and xki > 0, then by Reverse LCP,
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0, thus
pki = pj +
∂pj
∂xki
∑
k∈S(i)
xki
= at − bjXj −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl − (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)
∑
k∈S(i)
xki
= at − (2bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl (SS-price)
where Xi = Xj =
∑
k∈S(i) xki and CP (i) = CP (j) by Observation 2.3.
If ki is the MS case and xki > 0, then by Reverse LCP,
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0, thus
pki = pj +
∂pj
∂xki
∑
k∈S(i)
xki
= at − bjXj −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl − (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)
∑
k∈S(i)
xki
= at − (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)Xi − bjXj −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl
= at − (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl (MS-price)
where Xi =
∑
k∈S(i) xki and CP (i) = CP (j) ⊔ {j} by Observation 2.3 in this case.
Reaching the SM Case. Define the set of nodes NG such that for any node i ∈ NG, i
itself and all the children of i all have an empty self-merging child nodes set. Formally,
NG = {i | i ∈ V ∪ {s} such that ∀j ∈ C(i) ∪ {i}, Cs(j) = ∅}.
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NG denotes the set of nodes starting from t via reverse topological traversal until we reach a
set of nodes that are sellers in the SM case. These sellers can be defined as the set of nodes
SG, such that for any node i ∈ SG, there exists a buyer of i that belongs to NG. Formally,
SG = {i | i ∈ V ∪ {s} such that B(i) ∩NG 6= ∅}.
In the following figure, NG consists of the red nodes j1, v1, v2, l, k, and t, while SG
consists of the black nodes s and j2.
s
j1
j2
v1
v2
l
k
t
There must exist a node i ∈ SG such that all its buyers j ∈ B(i) belong to NG, and i is
the seller in the SM case. Given that pj where j ∈ B(i) are affine decreasing functions, the
utility of i is
Πi =
∑
j∈B(i)
pjxij −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki. (13)
Suppose the sellers of i make their best decision and offer i total inflow Xi = C such
that i accepts everything. i does not have control over the buying cost
∑
k∈S(i) pkixki and
the total inflow
∑
k∈S(i) xki at equilibrium. What i can decide is how to distribute C to its
buyers in NG. Here pki are regarded as constants given to i and Πi is a concave function.
There is also a constraint
∑
j∈B(i) xij =
∑
k∈S(i) xki. Therefore, we can rewrite the problem
of maximizing Πi as the following convex quadratic program:
max
x
∑
j∈B(i)
pjxij
subject to
∑
j∈B(i)
xij = C.
(SM-CQP)
Consider the Lagrangian function:
L(x, λ) =
∑
j∈B(i)
pjxij − λ(
∑
j∈B(i)
xij − C).
By taking the derivative of L(x, λ) with respect to xij , we have
∂L(x, λ)
∂xij
= pj +
∑
h∈B(i)
∂ph
∂xij
xih − λ
= at − bjxij −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl − bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXi − λ
= at − 2bjxij − 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl(Xl + C)− λ (14)
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where
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl(Xl + C) is fixed by the variables Xl and C which are decided by the
upstream buyers of i, thus regarded as a constant to i. The second equality follows by
rearranging and summing the inflow value of the merging nodes and the inductive hypothesis
on pj .∑
j∈B(i) pjxij is maximized when
∂L(xij ,λ)
∂xij
= 0 for each j ∈ B(i). This indicates
at − 2bjxij − 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl =
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl(Xl + C) + λ.
By rearranging, this can be formulated as a linear system{
2bjxij + 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl = D ∀j ∈ B(i),∑
j∈B(i) xij = C,
(SM-LS)
where D := at−
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl(Xl+C)−λ. Since the right hand side is the same for each linear
constraint j ∈ B(i), xij = αjC where
∑
j∈B(i) αj = 1 is the solution of SM-CQP. We focus
on finding the convex coefficients αj and the price pi.
Finding the Convex Coefficients and the Price. Consider the SM case where ij ∈ E.
We start with the simple SM case as a warm up and continue on the general SM case.
Simple SM: |B(i)| > 2, |S(j)| = 1, and |CS(i)| = 1:
j1
j2
jm
i j
...
...
...
...
h
In the simple SM case, CT (i, j) = CS(i) \ CP (i) is the same for each j ∈ B(i) so bjxij ,
so 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl is also the same. It suffices to find αi so that bjxij is the same for each
j ∈ B(i). Let
αj =
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
, (Simple-SM-αj)
then when xij = αjC, 2bjxij + 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl are the same for j ∈ B(i) in SM-LS. The
best strategy for i is to assign αjC on arc ij. For all j
′ ∈ B(i), b′j is positive so αj is also
positive. Therefore, if C is positive, then xij are all active.
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Price pj is the same for each j ∈ B(i):
pj = at − bjxij −
∑
l∈Cp(j)
blXl
= at − bj
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
C −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
= at − 1∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
Xi −
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
blXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
where the last equality holds since Xl = Xi when l ∈ CS(i) \ CP (i). The utility of i is
Πi = (at − 1∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
Xi −
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
blXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl)Xi −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki.
By taking the derivative of Πi with respect to xki, we have
∂Πi
∂xki
= at − 1∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
Xi −
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
blXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
− ( 1∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
+
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi − pki
= at − ( 2∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
+ 2
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl − pki.
We note that ∂Xi
∂xki
= 1 and ∂Xl
∂xki
= 1 for l ∈ CP (i) ∪ CS(i). By Reverse LCP, if xki > 0,
then ∂Πi
∂xki
= 0, so
pki = at − ( 2∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
+ 2
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl. (Simple-SM-price)
General SM: |B(i)| > 3, |S(j)| = 1, and |CS(i)| > 2:
j1
j2
jm
i j
...
...
...
...
...h1
hn
List the nodes in CS(i) as h1, h2, ..., hn according to a topological order, where h1 is the
first merging node, h2 is the second merging node, ..., hn is the last merging node in CS(i).
For each hk ∈ CS(i), let Bk(i) be the largest subset of B(i), such that for each j ∈ Bk(i), ij
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is the first arc of a corresponding disjoint path that eventually reaches hk without reaching
any hr where r < k. Let Pk(i) be the direct merging parent set consists of nodes hr that can
reach hk without passing any hl where r < l < k.
In the following example, CS(i) = {h1, h2}. The paths from i via j2 and j3 merge at h1.
The path from i via j1 reaches h2 without passing h1. B2(i) = {j1} and B1(i) = {j2, j3}.
P2(i) = {h1} and P1(i) = ∅.
i
j1
j2
j3
h1
v
h2
The calculation of αi is done in an inductive fashion. We start from k = 1, then k = 2,
and so on until k = n. We define an aggregate variable ck(i) for the vertices Bk(i) ⊔ {hk}
recursively as the following:
ck(i) :=
1∑
j∈Bk(i)
1
bj
+
∑
l|hl∈Pk(i)
1
cl(i)
+ bhk . (15)
When Pk(i) = ∅, we only consider the nodes in Bk(i). When hn is reached, if hn ∈ CP (i),
then bhn is not part of the aggregate variable bBn(i). Therefore,
cn(i) :=
1∑
j∈Bn(i)
1
bj
+
∑
l|hl∈Pn(i)
1
cl(i)
+
∑
l∈{hn}\CP (i)
bl. (16)
Now we find the convex coefficient for ij where j ∈ B(i), which allows us to rewrite pi in
terms of Xi. The approach is a traversal of merging nodes until hn is reached. At step k, for
each p such that hp ∈ Pk(i), the aggregate variable cp(i) with nodes j ∈ Bk(i) that merges
to hk is currently weighted by
βp(i) :=
1
cp(i)∑
j∈Bk(i)
1
bj
+
∑
l|hl∈Pk(i)
1
cl(i)
(17)
while node j ∈ Bk(i) is weighted by
βj :=
1
bj∑
j′∈Bk(i)
1
bj′
+
∑
l|hl∈Pk(i)
1
cl(i)
. (18)
For j ∈ B(i), the convex coefficient of ij is
αj = βj
∏
p|hp∈CT (i,j)\{hn}
βp(i). (General-SM-αj)
We note that αj is positive since bj′ and bl where j
′ ∈ B(i) and l ∈ CT (i, j′) are all positive.
When xij = αjC, 2bjxij + 2
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl are the same for j ∈ B(i) in SM-LS. Namely,
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xij = αjC is the solution of SM-LS. This implies if C > 0, then ij are all active. In
particular, when xij = αjC,
bjxij +
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl = cn(i)C = cn(i)Xi. (19)
Price pj is the same for each j ∈ B(i):
pj = at − bjxij −
∑
l∈Cp(j)
blXl
= at − bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl
= at − cn(i)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl. (20)
The utility of i is
Πi = (at − cn(i)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl)Xi −
∑
k∈S(i)
pkixki.
By taking the derivative of Πi with respect to xki, we have
∂Πi
∂xki
= at − cn(i)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl − (cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi − pki
= at − (2cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl − pki. (21)
We note that ∂Xi
∂xki
= 1 and ∂Xl
∂xki
= 1 for l ∈ CP (i). By Reverse LCP, if xki > 0, then
∂Πi
∂xki
= 0, so
pki = at − (2cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl. (General-SM-price)
When n = 1, the general SM case is exactly the simple SM case where P1(i) = ∅ and
B1(i) = B(i). By (16) and General-SM-αj,
c1(i) =
1∑
j∈B(i)
1
bj
+
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl and αj = βj =
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
b′j
.
Simple-SM-αj exactly matches General-SM-αj and Simple-SM-price exactly matches General-SM-price.
Reverse Topological Traversal until Reaching the Source. We have shown that
when the price function of t is an affine decreasing function of the inflow Xt, then by induc-
tion, at node i, whenever the SS, the MS, or the SM case is encountered, at equilibrium, the
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price of each active trade pki on arc ki is the same. This price can be rewritten as pi, which
is an affine decreasing function of the inflow Xi. When the source s is reached, the price at s
satisfies ps = as = at − bsXs. Since at > as and bs > 0, Xs > 0. At equilibrium, by the flow
conservation property, the fact that goods are distributed accordingly to the positive convex
coefficients in the SM case, and the assumption that there are no shortcuts, all arcs in E are
active, each seller k ∈ S(i) offers i the same price pi, and pi = at − biXi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl.
For completeness, we list the closed-form of bi and the convex coefficient αj. The closed-
form expression is used in Algorithm 1.
SS: By SS-price,
bi = 2bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
MS: By MS-price,
bi = bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
Simple SM: By Simple-SM-price and Simple-SM-αj ,
bi =
2∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
+ 2
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl and αj =
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
.
General SM: By General-SM-price and General-SM-αj,
bi = 2cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl and αj = βj
∏
p|hp∈CT (i,j)\{hn}
βp(i) (General SM)
where cn(i), βp(i), and βj are defined by (15), (16), (17), and (18).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1 Problem LCP is equivalent to the convex optimization problem CQP, and the
solution is unique.
Proof. We recall the feasibility problem LCP

∑
j∈B(i)
∂Πi
∂xij
xij = 0,
∂Πi
∂xij
6 0 ∀j ∈ B(i),
xij > 0 ∀j ∈ B(i).
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and the optimization problem CQP
min
x,X
∑
j∈B(i)
bjx
2
ij +
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
blX
2
l
subject to at − 2bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
2blXl 6 consti ∀j ∈ B(i),
xij > 0 ∀j ∈ B(i).
Consider the Lagrangian function:
L(x,X, λ) =
∑
j∈B(i)
bjx
2
ij +
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bkX
2
l
−
∑
j∈B(i)
λij(at − 2bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
2blXl − consti).
Stationarity condition:
• By taking the derivative of L with respect to xij , we have
∂L(x,X, λ)
∂xij
= 2bjxij − 2bjλij = 0
which infers xij = λij.
• By taking the derivative of L with respect to Xl where l ∈ CS(i) \ CP (i), we have
∂L(x,X, λ)
∂Xl
= 2blXl −
∑
j|l∈CP (j)
2blλij = 0
which infers Xl =
∑
j|l∈CP (j)
λij =
∑
j|l∈CP (j)
xij . This is exactly the definition of Xl
(the total flow through l).
Complementarity condition:
∀j ∈ B(s) (we recall that xij = λij):
λij(at − 2bjxij −
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
2blXl − consti) = xij ∂Πi
∂xij
= 0.
Combined with the primal feasibility conditions ∂Πi
∂xij
6 0 and xij > 0, the KKT condition
of CQP is equivalent to LCP. CQP is strictly convex, so the solution is unique.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3 Given an SPG, at an equilibrium, if ij ∈ E is a shortcut of a path lij and the
price pj is a decreasing function of Xj, then there is no trade on lij, i.e. all the arcs on the
path lij are inactive.
Proof. From the structure of SPG and the flow conservation property at equilibrium, if
path lij has an active arc, then there exists a path from i to j where all arcs are active. To
prove by contradiction, suppose ij is a shortcut of path lij = (i, v1, ..., vk, j), without loss of
generality, we can assume that all arcs in the path lij are active.
Since firms never sell goods at a lower price than the buying price, by Observation 2.2,
piv1 6 pv1v2 6 · · · 6 pvk−1vk 6 pvkj = pj.
Consider the case that piv1 < pj at the equilibrium, by the structure of SPG and the flow
conservation property, all the flow from i to v1 will go to firm j. If firm i moves xiv1 amount
of flow from iv1 to ij, the total flow through j will be the same (since pj is a function of Xj),
and pj will remain the same price. Therefore, firm i is better off by the difference from the
selling revenue
pj(xij + xiv1)− pjxij − pv1xiv1 > 0,
which cannot happen at an equilibrium. Thus, piv1 = pj must hold, and
piv1 = pv1v2 = · · · = pvk−1vk = pvkj = pj.
Now consider the optimal decision for vk, if she buys all the goods offered to her and sell
them to j, her profit is 0, because pvk−1vk = pj. However, she would make a positive profit
if she accepts and offers j less amount of goods. Because this would decrease the flow to j
and raise the optimal price of j from pj to p
′
j , that is,
p′j > pj = pvk−1vk ,
which contradicts to the flow conservation property at equilibrium. Hence, the path lij is
inactive.
B Proofs in Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1
Πi =
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i ∀i ∈ V ∪ {s}.
Proof. The proof is done case by case. Suppose i is the seller of a trade:
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• For the SS case, Xi = Xj = xij and CP (i) = CP (j). Consider the utility of i, by
equation SS:
Πi = (pj − pi)xij
= (biXi − bjXj)xij
= (bi −
bi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl
2
)X2i
=
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i .
• For the SM case, for each j ∈ B(i), we recall that ij is active and pki = pi at equilibrium
so the derivative in (21) must be 0:
∂Πi
∂xki
= at − (2cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl − pi = 0.
We recall the price of j in (20):
pj = at − cn(i)Xi −
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXl.
By rearranging and General SM, we have
pj − pi = (cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi
=
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xi.
Therefore,
Πi =
∑
j∈B(i)
(pj − pi)xij
=
∑
j∈B(i)
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)Xixij
=
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i .
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• For the MS case, xij = Xi and CP (i) = CP (j) ⊔ {j}. Consider the utility of i:
Πi = (pj − pi)xij
= (biXi +
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl + bjXj − bjXj −
∑
l∈CP (j)
blXl)Xi
= biX
2
i .
By equation MS:
bi = bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl
=
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl
=
bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl
2
.
Therefore,
Πi = biX
2
i =
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proposition 4.2 In the SS and the SM case, the utility of the seller is at least twice the
utility of the buyers’ total utility.
Proof. Consider the arc ij ∈ E. For the SS case, Xi = Xj = xij and CP (i) = CP (j). By
Lemma 4.1 and SS,
Πi =
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i
=
1
2
(2bj + 2
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)X
2
i
= 2Πj.
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For the SM case, Xj = xij , by (19) and Lemma 4.1,
cn(i)X
2
i = cn(i)Xi
∑
j∈B(i)
xij
=
∑
j∈B(i)
xij(bjxij +
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blXl)
>
∑
j∈B(i)
(bjx
2
ij +
∑
l∈CT (i,j)
blx
2
ij)
= 2
∑
j∈B(i)
Πj .
By General SM and Lemma 4.1,
Πi =
1
2
(2cn(i)Xi + 2
∑
l∈CP (i)
blXi)Xi
> cn(i)X
2
i
> 2
∑
j∈B(i)
Πj .
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3 If firm i is a dominating parent of firm j, then firm i has at least twice
the utility of firm j.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider the closest dominating parent i of j. Suppose
j is the buyer of a trade.
In the SS or SM case, the closest dominating parent of j is i ∈ S(j) so ij ∈ E. The claim
follows by Proposition 4.2.
Suppose along the path from i to j, j ends up to be a single buyer in the MS case. Then
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by General SM and Lemma 4.1,
Πi =
1
2
(bi +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i
=
1
2
(2cn(i) + 2
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl)X
2
i
> (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)X
2
i
> (bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl)X
2
j
= 2Πj
where the first inequality holds by cn(i) > bj , which can be proved by induction and equation
15, 16, 17, and 18, and the fact that i is the closest dominating parent of j implies CP (j) ⊆
CP (i); the second inequality holds by Xj 6 Xi.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2 λ(Y ) > 2 is a constant that is only relevant to the graph structure of Y .
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, ps = at− bsXs. While calculating the price function from the sink,
one can show that by induction and SS, MS, and General SM, bi where i ∈ V ∪ {s} changes
proportionally to bt, so λ(Y ) is a constant.
The remaining is to show that bs > 2bt by induction. For ij ∈ E, in the SS case, by SS,
bi > 2bj ; in the MS case, by MS, bi > 2bj ; in the SM case, bi > 2cn(i) > 2bhn by induction
and equation 15, 16, 17, 18, and General SM, where hn is the farthest node from i in CS(i).
Combining these cases, bs > 2bt.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proposition 4.5 With a fixed network structure, if the demand at the market increases or
the cost at the source decreases, then the market is more flow and welfare efficient and the
utility of each individual firm increases.
Proof. It follows that Xs =
at−as
bs
, so the increasing demand at market (at) or decreasing
cost at the source (as) will make the flow value larger. Since bt is not changed, by (10), the
coefficients of the quadratic terms (X2i and X
2
t ) do not change either. By lemma 3.2, the
flow is distributed proportionally to the convex coefficients in the SM case (for the SS and
MS case, just sum the flow from the upstream), so the flow increases proportionally as well.
Therefore, the flow and welfare efficiency both increases, and by Lemma 4.1, the utility of
each individual firm increases.
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B.6 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Lemma 4.4 Given SPGs Y and Z such that P (Y, Z) does not have any shortcuts,
λ(P (Y, Z)) =
(λ(Y )− 2)(λ(Z)− 2)
λ(Y ) + λ(Z)− 4 + 2.
Proof. The parallel composition P (Y, Z) creates an SM case at the source. Therefore, it
suffices to find the convex coefficients for solving SM-LS. Let αYj (respectively α
Z
j ) be the
convex coefficient for sY j ∈ E(Y ) (respectively sZj ∈ E(Z)) where j ∈ B(sY ) (respectively
B(sZ)). If sY (respectively sZ) is the buyer of the SS case, then α
Y
j = 1 (respectively
αZj = 1). The convex coefficients are
λ(Z)−2
λ(Y )+λ(Z)−2
αYj for each j ∈ B(sY ) and λ(Y )−2λ(Y )+λ(Z)−2αZj
for each j ∈ B(sZ). Suppose btP (Y,Z) = btY = btZ , bsY = λ(Y )btY , and bsZ = λ(Z)btZ , then by
(16) and General SM,
bsP (Y,Z) = (
(λ(Y )− 2)(λ(Z)− 2)
λ(Y ) + λ(Z)− 4 + 2)btP (Y,Z) .
C Proofs in Section 5
C.1 Proof Sketch of Proposition 5.1
Proposition 5.1 Given an SMSPG, if all the markets have the same demand, then there
exists a unique equilibrium that can be found in polynomial time.
Proof Sketch. Without loss of generality, we consider shortcut-free SMSPG. The derivation
of the equilibrium price is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2. We inductively start from the
sink markets in T and the price function at each firm is affine decreasing before an SM case is
reached. For the SM case, the buyer does not have the control over the buying cost and inflow
at equilibrium, so a convex quadratic program SM-CQP can be derived. By considering the
Lagrangian function, the linear system SM-LS can be formulated. The solution of SM-LS is
to distribute the flow proportionally to the convex coefficients where each of them is positive,
so each trade is active. The flow distribution according to the convex coefficients gives a
closed-form expression of the price offered to the buyer. This procedure goes on inductively
until the source is reached. When the source is reached, we compute the total flow value
of the network and use Algorithm 2 to compute the equilibrium flow. The uniqueness of
the equilibrium follows by Lemma 3.1. The problem of distributing the flow for an SM case
buyer can be described as an LCP which has an equivalent CQP, and its solution is unique.
We note that when all markets have the same demand, it suffices to focus on the calcu-
lation of bi for each i ∈ V ∪ {s}. The equilibrium calculation is more complicated if that is
not the case.
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C.2 Proof of Remark 5.1
We consider the following supply chain network:
sps = as v
1
2
p1 = a1 − b1x1
p2 = a2 − b2x2
Xv
x1
x2
For simplicity, we denote the first market price as p1 and the second market price as p2.
The production cost is a constant as. Let the inflow of market 1 be x1 and the inflow of
market 2 be x2. Suppose the two price functions at the markets are:
p1 = a1 − b1x1,
p2 = a2 − b2x2,
where a1 > a2 > as.
Throughout the proof, we add a superscript h for variables under the high price strategy
and l for the low price strategy.
• The low price strategy always gives a higher flow value than the high price strategy.
Proof. With the high price strategy, xh2 = 0, so it is equivalent to regard the entire
supply chain as a line graph from s to v then from v to market 1. Therefore, phv =
a1 − 2b1Xhv . The optimal flow Xhv under the high price strategy is
as = a1 − 4b1Xhv =⇒ Xhv =
a1 − as
4b1
. (22)
Under the low price strategy, the utility of v is
Πv = (a1 − b1x1)x1 + (a2 − b2x2)x2 − plv(x1 + x2).
x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, so
∂Πv
∂x1
= 0 and ∂Πv
∂x2
= 0:
{
a1 − 2b1x1 − plv = 0,
a2 − 2b2x2 − plv = 0,
=⇒ a1b2 + a2b1 − 2b1b2(x1 + x2)− (b1 + b2)plv = 0. (23)
The optimal flow X lv under the low price strategy is
plv = (a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − 2BX lv,
ps = as = (a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − 4BX lv,
X lv =
(a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − as
4B
, (24)
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where B = 11
b1
+ 1
b2
.
Then we have the difference of total flow between these two strategies:
X lv −Xhv =
(a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − as
4B
− a1 − as
4b1
=
a2
4b2
− as
4B
+
as
4b1
=
a2
4b2
− as
4b1
− as
4b2
+
as
4b1
=
a2
4b2
− as
4b2
> 0. (25)
• When the demand difference between two markets is small enough, the low price strat-
egy gives better utility for the source. When the difference is large enough, the high
price strategy gives better utility for the source.
Proof. Let Πv be the utility of firm v, and Πs be the utility of firm s. Under the high
price strategy:
Πhv = b1X
h
v
2
, (26)
Πhs = 2b1X
h
v
2
=
(a1 − as)2
8b1
. (27)
To get the social welfare under the low price strategy, from (23) and (24):
plv = a1 − 2b1x1 = a2 − 2b2x2,
x1 + x2 = X
l
v,
infers
x1 =
a1 − a2 + 2b2X lv
2b1 + 2b2
,
x2 =
2b1X
l
v − a1 + a2
2b1 + 2b2
,
where
X lv =
(a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − as
4B
and B =
1
1
b1
+ 1
b2
.
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We have
Πls = (p
l
v − as)X lv = 2BX lv2 (28)
= 2B[
(a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − as
4B
]2 =
[(a1/b1 + a2/b2)B − as]2
8B
.
By taking the ratio between (27) and (28),
Πhs
Πls
=
b1X
h
v
2
BX lv
2 =
b1 + b2
b2
Xhv
2
(Xhv +∆)
2
where ∆ = a2−as
4b2
is irrelevant to a1 by (25).
s has no preference between the high price and the low price strategy when
Xhv
Xhv +∆
=
√
b1
b1 + b2
=⇒
√
b1 + b2(
a1 − as
4b1
) =
√
b1(
a1 − as
4b1
+∆)
=⇒
√
b1 + b2 −
√
b1
4b1
a1 =
√
b1 + b2 −
√
b1
4b1
as +
√
b1∆
=⇒ a1 = as + 4b
3
2
1∆√
b1 + b2 −
√
b1
.
Xhv increases linearly to a1. When a1 is below this value, then the ratio is smaller than
1 and s prefers the low price strategy. When a1 is above this value, then the ratio is
greater than 1 and s prefers the high price strategy.
• The low price strategy always produces higher social welfare.
Proof. Let CS be the consumer surplus, and SW be the social welfare. Under the
high price strategy, by (22), (26), and (27):
CSh =
1
2
b1X
h
v
2
,
SW h = CSh +Πhv +Π
h
s =
7
2
b1X
h
v
2
=
7
2
b1(
a1 − as
4b1
)2 =
7(a1 − as)2
32b1
.
46
Under the low price strategy:
CSl =
1
2
b1x
2
1 +
1
2
b2x
2
2,
Πlv = x1(p
l
1 − plv) + x2(pl2 − plv) = b1x21 + b2x22,
SW l = CSl +Πlv +Π
l
s
=
3
2
(b1x
2
1 + b2x
2
2) + Π
l
s
=
3[b1(a1 − a2 + 2b2X lv)2 + b2(2b1X lv − a1 + a2)2]
8(b1 + b2)2
+Πls
=
3b1[(a1 − a2)2 + 4b22X lv2 + 4a1b2X lv − 4a2b2X lv]
8(b1 + b2)2
+
3b2[(a1 − a2)2 + 4b21X lv2 − 4a1b1X lv + 4a2b1X lv]
8(b1 + b2)2
+Πls
=
3[(b1 + b2)(a1 − a2)2 + 4b1b2(b1 + b2)X lv2]
8(b1 + b2)2
+Πls
=
3(a1 − a2)2
8(b1 + b2)
+
3BX lv
2
2
+ 2BX lv
2
=
3(a1 − a2)2
8(b1 + b2)
+
7BX lv
2
2
.
By taking the difference and (28),
SW l − SW h = 3(a1 − a2)
2
8(b1 + b2)
+
7
2
[
b1b2
b1 + b2
(Xhv +∆)
2 − b1Xhv 2]
=
3(a1 − a2)2
8(b1 + b2)
+
7
2
[
−b21
b1 + b2
Xhv
2
+
b1(a2 − as)Xhv
2(b1 + b2)
+
b1(a2 − as)2
16b2(b1 + b2)
]
=
12b2(a1 − a2)2 − 7b2(a1 − as)2 + 14b2(a2 − as)(a1 − as) + 7b1(a2 − as)2
32b2(b1 + b2)
=
12b2(a1 − a2)2 − 7b2[(a1 − as)− (a2 − as)]2 + 7(b1 + b2)(a2 − as)2
32b2(b1 + b2)
=
5b2(a1 − a2)2 + 7(b1 + b2)(a2 − as)2
32b2(b1 + b2)
> 0
where ∆ = a2−as
4b2
.
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D Examples
Example 5 (Merging Child Nodes)
s a
b
c
d
e
f
g h
i
j
t
In this graph, for node a, CS(a) = {g, h}, because {g, h} ⊆ C(a) and there are multiple
disjoint paths from a to g and h, while t /∈ CS(a) because all the paths from a to t must
go through the common node h; CP (a) = {h} because h ∈ C(a), s ∈ P (a), and there are
multiple disjoint paths from s to h; CT (a, b) = ∅, while CT (a, c) = {g}.
For node c, CP (c) = {g, h}, while CS(c) = ∅; For node g, CP (g) = {h}, while CS(g) = ∅.
By Observation 2.3, since a and c satisfy the SM relation, CP (c) = {g, h} = CP (a) ⊔
CT (a, c). c and g satisfy the MS relation, so CP (c) = {g, h} = CP (g) ⊔ {g}.
Example 6 (Price Function Computation by Algorithm 1)
Consider the following network.
ps = 1 s
j1
j2
v1
v2
l
k
t pt = 2−Xt
We recall the equations in Algorithm 1:
SS:
bi = 2bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
MS:
bi = bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
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Simple SM:
bi =
2∑
j∈B(i)
1
bj
+ 2
∑
l∈CS(i)\CP (i)
bl +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl,
αj =
1
bj∑
j′∈B(i)
1
bj′
for each j ∈ B(i).
By Algorithm 1, for the MS case from k and l to t:
pk = 2−Xk −Xt,
pl = 2−Xl −Xt.
For the MS case from v1 and v2 to l:
pv2 = 2− 2Xv1 −Xl −Xt,
pv3 = 2− 2Xv2 −Xl −Xt.
For the SS case from j1 to k:
pj1 = 2− 3Xj1 −Xt.
For the SM case from j2 to v1 and v2:
pj2 = 2− (
2
1
2
+ 1
2
+ 2 + 1)Xj2 −Xt
= 2− 5Xj2 −Xt,
αv1 = αv2 =
1
2
1
2
+ 1
2
=
1
2
.
For the SM case from s to j1 and j2:
ps = 2− ( 21
3
+ 1
5
+ 2)Xt
= 2− 23
4
Xt,
Xs =
4
23
(2− 1) = 4
23
,
αj1 =
1
3
1
3
+ 1
5
=
5
8
,
αj2 =
1
5
1
3
+ 1
5
=
3
8
.
Example 7 (Price Function Computation for General SM)
49
Consider the following network.
ps = 1 s
j1
j2
j3
l
k
t pt = 2−Xt
From the equations in A.2:
SS:
bi = 2bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
MS:
bi = bj +
∑
l∈CP (j)
bl.
General SM:
bi = 2cn(i) +
∑
l∈CP (i)
bl and αj = βj
∏
p|hp∈CT (i,j)\{hn}
βp(i)
where cn(i), βp(i), and βj are defined by equation 15, 16, 17, and 18.
By the backward Algorithm 1, for the MS case from k and l to t:
pk = 2−Xk −Xt,
pl = 2−Xl −Xt.
For the MS case from j2 and j3 to l:
pj2 = 2− 2Xj2 −Xl −Xt,
pj3 = 2− 2Xj3 −Xl −Xt.
For the SS case from j1 to k:
pj1 = 2− 3Xj1 −Xt.
The remaining is the general SM case from s to j1, j2, and j3. By following the notations
in A.2, CS(s) = {h1, h2} where h1 = l and h2 = t. B2(s) = {j1}, B1(s) = {j2, j3},
P2(i) = {h1}, and P1(s) = ∅. We start with the aggregate variable c1(s) since P1(s) = ∅.
c1(s) =
1
1
bj2
+ 1
bj3
+ bl =
1
1
2
+ 1
2
+ 1 = 2,
bs =
2
1
bj1
+ 1
c1(s)
+ 2bt =
2
1
3
+ 1
2
+ 2 =
22
5
.
Therefore, ps = 1− 225 Xs = 0 and Xs = 522 . For the convex coefficients,
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βj2 = βj3 =
1
2
1
2
+ 1
2
=
1
2
,
αj1 = βj1 =
1
3
1
3
+ 1
2
=
2
5
,
β1(s) =
1
2
1
3
+ 1
2
=
3
5
,
αj2 = αj3 =
1
2
βbB1(s) =
3
10
.
Example 8 (Price and Flow Computation by Algorithm 2)
We use the same SPG as in Example 6.
ps = 1 s
j1
j2
v1
v2
l
k
t pt = 2−Xt
From Example 6, Xs =
4
23
, αj1 =
5
8
, αj2 =
3
8
, and αv1 = αv2 =
1
2
. By Lemma 3.2,
xsj1 =
4
23
× 5
8
=
5
46
,
xsj2 =
4
23
× 3
8
=
3
46
,
pj1 = 1− 3Xj1 −Xt = 2− 3×
5
46
− 4
23
=
3
2
,
pj2 = 1− 5Xj2 −Xt = 2− 5×
3
46
− 4
23
=
3
2
,
xj2v1 = xj2v2 =
xsj2
2
=
3
92
,
pv1 = pv2 = 2− 2Xv1 −Xl −Xt = 2− 2×
3
92
− 3
46
− 4
23
=
39
23
.
We can continue the price calculation by a topological order. Since there are no multiple
buyers case later on, the flow to the downstream is just the sum of the inflow from upstream.
Example 9 (SPG with a Shortcut)
Consider the following network where st is a shortcut of path (s, v, t).
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sps = 1
v
t pt = 3−Xt = 3− x− y
x x
y
At equilibrium, suppose s offers v price psv, and let x = xsv = xvt and y = xst. The
utility of v is
Πv = (3− x− y)x− psvx.
Take the derivative of Πv with respect to x, since Πv is concave, the best psv satisfies:
∂Πv
∂x
= 3− 2x− y − psv = 0⇒ psv = 3− 2x− y.
The utility of s is
Πs = psvx+ pty − ps(x+ y)
= (3− 2x− y)x+ (3− x− y)y − (x+ y)
= 2x+ 2y − 2x2 − y2 − 2xy.
Take the derivative of Πs with respect to x and y, since Πs is concave, we have:
∂Πs
∂x
= 2− 4x− 2y = 0,
∂Πs
∂y
= 2− 2x− 2y = 0.
The equilibrium solution is x = 0 and y = 1. sv and vt are inactive.
Example 10 (Multiple Equilibria in SMSPG)
sps = as a
t1
t2
pt1 = at1 − x
pt2 = at2 − y
Xa
x
y
Suppose at1 > at2 > as. The high price strategy for s is such that x > 0 and y = 0 when
a tries to maximize its utility Πa = (at1 − x− pa)x, so
∂Πa
∂x
= at1 − 2x− pa = 0 =⇒ pa = at1 − 2x.
s tries to maximize its utility Πs = (at1 − 2x− as)x given the above pa, so
∂Πs
∂x
= at1 − 4x− ps = 0 =⇒ ps = at1 − 4x = as =⇒ Xa = x =
at1 − as
4
,
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and the high price utility of s is
Πs = (pa − ps)Xa = (at1 − 2Xa − as)
at1 − as
4
=
(at1 − as)2
8
.
The low price strategy for s is such that x > 0 and y > 0 when a tries to maximize its
utility Πa = (at1 − x− pa)x+ (at2 − y − pa)y, so{
∂Πa
∂x
= at1 − 2x− pa = 0,
∂Πa
∂y
= at2 − 2y − pa = 0,
=⇒ pa = at1 + at2
2
− (x+ y).
s tries to maximize its utility Πs = (
at1+at2
2
− (x+ y)− as)(x+ y) given the above pa, so
∂Πs
∂x+ y
=
at1 + at2
2
− 2(x+ y)− ps = 0
which implies
ps =
at1 + at2
2
− 2(x+ y) = as =⇒ Xa = x+ y = at1 + at2 − 2as
4
,
and the low price utility of s is
Πs = (pa − as)Xa = (at1 + at2
2
−Xa − as)at1 + at2 − 2as
4
=
(at1 + at2 − 2as)2
16
.
The high price strategy and the low price strategy give the same utility to s when
(at1 − as)2
8
=
(at1 + at2 − 2as)2
16
=⇒ at1 = (1 +
√
2)at2 −
√
2as.
For price feasibility for the low price strategy, we must have
at2 > pa =⇒ at2 >
at1 + at2
2
− (x+ y) = at1 + at2 + 2as
4
=⇒ 3at2 > at1 + 2as
which is feasible when the high price utility and the low price utility are the same for s since
at1 + 2as = (1 +
√
2)at2 −
√
2as + 2as
= (1 +
√
2)at2 + (2−
√
2)as
6 (1 +
√
2)at2 + (2−
√
2)at2
= 3at2 .
There are multiple equilibria when at1 = (1 +
√
2)at2 −
√
as since s can play either the
high price or the low price strategy. We note that in the left upper figure in Figure 3, s has
no preference when at1 = 19.07 = (1 +
√
2)at2 −
√
2as = (1 +
√
2)12− 7√2 = 12 + 5√2 and
by fixing at2 = 12, (12, 3× 12− 2× 7] = (12, 22] is the low price feasible interval for at1 .
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Example 11 (SMSPG without an Equilibrium)
s1
s2
ps1 = 1
ps2 = 1
c t pt = 2− x− y
x
y
x+ y
Suppose there is an equilibrium where s1 offers the price ps1c to c and s2 offers the price
ps2c to c, then c tries to maximize its utility
Πc = (2− x− y)(x+ y)− ps1cx− ps2cy
where
∂Πc
∂x
= 2− 2(x+ y)− ps1c and
∂Πc
∂y
= 2− 2(x+ y)− ps2c.
The equilibrium is a solution of the following LCP:

(2− 2x− 2y − ps1c)x+ (2− 2x− 2y − ps2c)y = 0,
2− 2x− 2y − ps1c 6 0,
2− 2x− 2y − ps2c 6 0,
x > 0,
y > 0.
Now fix the price ps1c ∈ (1, 2). To maximize the utility of s2, the best response is to set
ps2c = ps1c − ε so that c does not buy anything from s1. s1 can have a similar best response
to the strategy of s2. s1 and s2 will just set their selling price as close as possible to 1.
Example 12 (Equilibrium in General DAGs)
sps = 1
a
b
c
d
t pt = 11− (x+ y + z)
x
y + z
x
y
z
x+ y
z
We compute the price function from t in this network and consider the following cases:
• x > 0 and y + z = 0: In this case, it is equivalent to consider the line network:
sps = 1 a c t pt = 11− xx x x
We have
pc = 11− 2x, pa = 11− 4x, and
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ps = 11− 8x = 1 =⇒ x = 5
4
.
The utility of s is
(pa − ps)x = 4x2 = 25
4
.
• x = 0 and y + z > 0: In this case, the best strategy for s is to make y > 0 and z > 0,
so it is equivalent to consider the following network:
sps = 1 b
c
d
t pt = 11− (y + z)
y + z
y
z
y
z
By Algorithm 1 and 2, we have
pc = 11− 2y − z, pd = 11− y − 2z, pb = 11− 3(y + z),
and ps = 11− 6(y + z) = 1 =⇒ y + z = 5
3
.
The utility of s is
(pb − ps)(y + z) = 3(y + z)2 = 25
3
.
• x > 0 and y + z > 0: In this case, if the equilibrium is equivalent to consider the
following network:
sps = 1
a
b
c
d
t pt = 11− (x+ y)
x
z
x
z
x
z
then by Algorithm 1 and 2, we have
pa = 11− 4x− z, pb = 11− x− 4z,
ps = 11− 5(x+ z) = 1 =⇒ x+ z = 2, and x = z = 1.
The utility of s is
(pa − ps)x+ (pb − ps)z = 5 + 5 = 10.
Besides, pac = 11− 2x− z = pbd = 11− x− 2z = 8.
This is indeed an equilibrium. Given that pac = 8, if b wants to earn profit from c, then
b must set the price pbc 6 8. However, b does not have the incentive to compete with a
because b can sell all the goods with z = 1 to d at price pbd = 8.
The equilibrium is the last case when x = z = 1, y = 0, psa = psb = 6, pac = 11 − 2x− z =
8 = 11− x− 2z = pbd, and pbc can be any positive number.
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